

International Message Form

AUSTRALIAN DIPLOMATIC NETWORK

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Reference No	O. JA 11914	Time/date of lodgment	RECEIVED	XXXX	CLA
TO	ACTION POSTS (TO)				
PP	CANBERRA	9649			
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THE DIRECTOR-GENERAL OF POLITICAL AFFAIRS, DARUSMAN, CALLED ME TO THE FOREIGN MINISTRY THIS AFTERNOON.

2. READING FROM NOTES, HE SAID THAT HE HAD BEEN INSTRUCTED TO INFORM ME THAT THE INDONESIAN GOVERNMENT WAS "GRAVELY CONCERNED" ABOUT DUNN'S INVOLVEMENT IN ACTIVITIES HOSTILE TO INDONESIA, TO THE EXTENT THAT HE WAS NOW TO APPEAR BEFORE THE FRASER SUB-COMMITTEE IN WASHINGTON.

3. DARUSMAN SAID THAT THE INDONESIAN GOVERNMENT TOOK A "SERIOUS VIEW" OF THIS SITUATION. WE MUST EXPECT THIS TO BE REFLECTED IN OUR BILATERAL RELATIONSHIPS UNLESS THE AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT WAS SEEN TO ACT. DUNN WAS A PUBLIC SERVANT. INDONESIA BELIEVED THE AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT SHOULD TRY TO PREVENT DUNN FROM ACTING IN A MANNER CONTRARY TO AUSTRALIA'S STATED POLICY TOWARDS INDONESIA AND POTENTIALLY DAMAGING TO INDONESIA'S INTERESTS IN

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Authorised by:	(Enter distribution instructions on reverse side of form)			
R.A. WOOLCOTT	Signature	14.3.77	AMBASSADOR	.. / 2.
Block letters		Date	Dept/Bch/Sect	Phone No.

FRIENDLY THIRD COUNTRIES.

4. IT WAS EVEN POSSIBLE, DARUSMAN ADDED, THAT DUNN'S ACTIVITIES COULD "JEOPARDISE FUTURE UNITED STATES MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO INDONESIA." THIS WOULD BE A MATTER OF GRAVE CONCERN NOT ONLY TO INDONESIA BUT TO OTHER ASEAN COUNTRIES. AUSTRALIA, TOO, WHICH HAD A SHARED CONCERN FOR THE DEFENCE OF THE SOUTHEAST ASIAN REGION SHOULD BE WORRIED ABOUT THIS PROSPECT.

5. DARUSMAN SAID THAT UP TILL THIS POINT THE INDONESIAN PRESS HAD NOT BEEN INVOLVED WITH THE DUNN ALLEGATIONS OR AUSTRALIA'S APPARENT LACK OF OFFICIAL RESPONSE TO THEM. WE COULD NOT ASSUME THAT THIS "RESTRAINT" ON INDONESIA'S PART WOULD CONTINUE. DARUSMAN ADDED THAT HE HOPED THE SITUATION WOULD NOT BE PERMITTED TO COME TO THE POINT WHERE INDONESIA FELT IT NECESSARY TO PUT THE BLAME FOR ANY DAMAGE DUE TO DUNN'S

ACTIVITIES ON THE AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT. I SAID THAT I THOUGHT THIS WOULD BE UNFAIR AND PROBABLY COUNTER-PRODUCTIVE.

6. DARUSMAN SAID IT WAS NOT ONLY IN RESPECT OF THE UNITED STATES THAT INDONESIA WAS CONCERNED. DUNN WAS ALSO TRYING TO STIR UP HOSTILITY TOWARDS INDONESIA IN THE NETHERLANDS, APPARENTLY IN THE HOPE THAT THE DUTCH GOVERNMENT WOULD HAVE SECOND THOUGHTS ON THE DELIVERY OF THREE CORVETTES TO INDONESIA.

7. DARUSMAN SAID THAT, IN SHORT, THE INDONESIAN GOVERNMENT WANTED THE AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT TO ACT TO STOP DUNN'S ACTIVITIES OR, IF IT REALLY FELT UNABLE TO DO SO, THEN AT LEAST

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TO ACT TO MINIMISE THEIR LIKELY ADVERSE EFFECTS ON AUSTRALIAN/INDONESIAN RELATIONS AND ON INDONESIA ITSELF. INDONESIA HAD BEEN GIVEN A NUMBER OF ASSURANCES, INCLUDING BY THE AUSTRALIAN PRIME MINISTER, THAT WE WANTED TO PUT THE TIMOR DISPUTE BEHIND US. IT DID NOT APPEAR THAT THESE ASSURANCES WERE BEING FOLLOWED BY ACTION WHEN HOSTILE GROUPS WERE SEEKING TO KEEP THE ISSUE ALIVE.

8. I SAID THAT DUNN HAD MADE A NUMBER OF SERIOUS ALLEGATIONS ABOUT THE BEHAVIOUR OF INDONESIAN FORCES IN EAST TIMOR WHICH HAD DISTURBED MANY AUSTRALIANS. MOREOVER, HE HAD DONE THIS IN HIS PRIVATE CAPACITY. THE AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT COULD NOT BE EXPECTED TO IGNORE THE SITUATION. BUT THE AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT HAD MADE IT PLAIN THAT DUNN HAD ACTED IN A PURELY PRIVATE CAPACITY. DARUSMAN INTERJECTED TO SAY THAT INDONESIA CONSIDERED THE STATEMENTS MADE ABOUT DUNN SO FAR TO BE "WEAK".

9. I SAID IT WOULD SEEM TO ME TO BE UP TO INDONESIA RATHER THAN AUSTRALIA TO DEFEND ITS OWN POSITION, IF IT WISHED TO DO SO BEFORE THE FRASER SUB-COMMITTEE. DARUSMAN SAID INDONESIA HAD ALREADY TOLD THE STATE DEPARTMENT THAT INDONESIA ITSELF WOULD NOT PARTICIPATE IN ANY FRASER COMMITTEE HEARINGS. IT WOULD, HOWEVER, GIVE INFORMATION TO THE AMERICAN AMBASSADOR HERE. EAST TIMORESE REPRESENTATIVES, SUCH AS LOPEZ DA CRUZ AND MARIO CARRESCAJO WOULD TESTIFY BEFORE THE COMMITTEE. HOWEVER, SINCE

AN AUSTRALIAN PUBLIC SERVANT WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE SITUATION AND WAS TESTIFYING AGAINST INDONESIA, THE INDONESIANS FELT THAT THE AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT SHOULD ENCOURAGE AN AUSTRALIAN SPOKESMAN, PERHAPS A MEMBER OF PARLIAMENT, TO PUT THE GOVERNMENT'S VIEW. I SAID THAT I WOULD PASS THIS SUGGESTION ON TO CANBERRA BUT I DID NOT EXPECT THAT THE AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT WOULD AGREE TO AN AUSTRALIAN OFFICIAL APPEARING BEFORE THE COMMITTEE. ALSO IT WOULD PROBABLY BE RELUCTANT TO ENCOURAGE AN AUSTRALIAN MEMBER OF PARLIAMENT TO CONTEST DUNN'S EVIDENCE IN HIS PRIVATE CAPACITY. DARUSMAN ASKED WHY NOT AND REPEATED THAT, AS IT WAS AN AUSTRALIAN OFFICIAL WHO WAS CAUSING THE PRESENT PROBLEM, IT WAS TIME FOR SOME ACTION ON THE AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT'S PART. DARUSMAN ADDED THAT THE INDONESIANS WOULD PROBABLY ASK SYDELL TO APPEAR. SYDELL WAS AN AUSTRALIAN, AN EX-SERVICEMAN, AND HE HAD BEEN IN TIMOR FOR LONGER, AND MORE RECENTLY, THAN DUNN.

10. DARUSMAN SAID THAT IT WAS SURPRISING TO INDONESIA THAT DUNN WOULD BE IN THE UNITED STATES STIRRING UP ANTI-INDONESIAN FEELING AT THE SAME TIME AS THE MINISTER WOULD BE THERE. I AGREED THAT THIS WAS UNDESIRABLE, ^{SAID I} ~~BUT~~ I PRESUMED IT WAS A COINCIDENCE. DARUSMAN SAID THAT THE INDONESIANS HAD REASON TO DOUBT THIS. DUNN AND HIS REPORT WERE BEING USED AS A WEAPON IN WHAT WAS AN "EFFECTIVE ANTI-INDONESIAN PROPAGANDA CAMPAIGN". FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF LEFT-WING, ANTI-INDONESIAN FORCES IN AUSTRALIA, THE TIMING WAS EXCELLENT. IT WAS HARD TO

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ACCEPT THAT IT WAS A COINCIDENCE.

11. DARUSMAN ADDED THAT HE HOPED MR PEACOCK HIMSELF WOULD HELP PUT THE DUNN REPORT IN PERSPECTIVE IN ANY DISCUSSIONS HE MIGHT HAVE WITH AMERICAN CONGRESSMEN AND THAT HE WOULD ALSO EMPHASIZE THE IMPORTANCE OF CONTINUING WESTERN DEFENCE ASSISTANCE TO INDONESIA.

12. DARUSMAN SAID THAT THE INDONESIAN GOVERNMENT WOULD WELCOME AN EARLY AUSTRALIAN REACTION TO THESE REPRESENTATIONS.

COMMENT

13. WE HAVE SENSED FOR SOME TIME THAT THE INDONESIANS HAVE BEEN GROWING INCREASINGLY CONCERNED RECENTLY ABOUT THE POSSIBLE RESULTS OF DUNN'S ACTIVITIES (AND THOSE OF SOME MEMBERS OF PARLIAMENT). THE GIST OF DARUSMAN'S REPRESENTATIONS IS THE THREAT THAT IF WE DO NOT CURTAIL DUNN'S ACTIVITIES OR, AT LEAST, IF WE ARE NOT SEEN TO BE ~~WITHOUT~~ TRYING TO HELP THEM DEAL WITH THE SITUATION, THEN WE CAN EXPECT A STRONG INDONESIAN REACTION, INCLUDING ^{AT LEAST} THE ENCOURAGEMENT OF THE PRESS TO BE CRITICAL OF THE AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT (PARA. 5 OF JA.10390 OF 14/12/76).

WOOLCOTT

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