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TRANSCRIPTS OF INTERVIEWS ON EAST TIMOR

Conducted in Jakarta

by

Juan Federer

25 January - 7 February 1992

Nature : ***Restricted / Confidential***

1. EMMA BAULTCH & TIA- Infight/Skephi. 25/1/92

a. Social attitudes towards East Timor in Indonesia:

Some in NGO circles are beginning to think that it would be best to let East Timor go. The debate on this has increased since 12 November. The question is being asked : what has been the economic benefit of keeping it? No short term benefits are evident, even if long term possibilities related to the Timor Strait are acknowledged.

It is necessary to educate Indonesian society on the reality of the situation in ET, its history of brutal repression and Human Rights violations. Only since 12 November is society beginning to be aware. Support is initially for a reduction of Human Rights violations, rather than for self-determination.

All Indonesian Ministers are at present trying to show how they regret the 12 November events and how much the Government cares for East Timor.

b. Media:

Temporary press openness towards East Timor was evident, as military have supported certain papers, aiming to embarrass Suharto. Now there is a closing again so as to prevent too much reporting on East Timor going on.

The Jakarta Jakarta sackings took place, rather than closure of the publication, so as to prevent debate on the issue erupting again. Berita Buana has been taken over again by retired ABRI people as result of publishing a critical Carrascalaõ interview, after having given it to business people to run, when its circulation had improved.

The damaging social condemnation, primarily through the press, has resulted in the various military factions coming together again, seeking to protect themselves in unity.

c. East Timorese in Jakarta/Bali:

i) Workers brought to Jakarta by Soeharto's daughter are experiencing great hardship. Can't possibly live on Rp 2,000 per day wages, without social group supports as Javanese can. They are spread through several cities. Total about 300 people. Would like to return to Dili and would need about Rp 100,000 each for this. Their presence in Java has one positive result: they tell the population about the reality in East Timor, about which common people know little. If supported they could do more in this respect.

ii) Students: the situation of those detained after the November demonstrations is tragic. Their scholarships were discontinued so they have no income, no food etc. They would like to set up income generating activities, but have no capital. To continue studying they would need about Rp 150,000 monthly. **Could funds be provided from abroad?**

Contacts of these people with Dili is at present interrupted. Telephones are not useable.

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3. RAMON BLECUA - First Secretary, Spanish Embassy Jkt.- 27/1/92
Recently visited Dili and keeps contact with East Timorese in Jakarta.

Try Sutrisno destroyed himself with 12 November. There will be greater military discipline now- this is preferable as it avoids excesses occurring again.

There is no consideration to East Timor self-determination among any in the present Government. The Government continues to be strong and will last. The opposition does not count. The Javanese culture is very peculiar. Even when Soeharto goes, there quickly will be another successor emerging and the status quo will be maintained. There is no dialectic process in this political system, so most observers cant read the signs.

There is no international support for East Timor. It is not like Brunei, it is poor. The oil wealth is doubtful. East Timorese are divided, unable to rule themselves. Falintil only has 200 or so men. Alatas tried to resolve the problem with Portugal, but it backfired: very damaging to him. Portugal should properly use its international advantage as acknowledged administrating power to negotiate with Indonesia, yet it does not.

East Timor is a painful human tragedy, but unfortunately nothing can be done to change the situation.

Australia acts in an ambiguous and confusing manner regarding East Timor: they support Indonesia yet profess to defend principles.

[the above views are interesting as they reflect the common wisdom of most diplomatic personnel in Jakarta, and the position they tend to take in their reports to their own Governments]

****This is strictly confidential and may in no way be identifiably attributed****

2. XXXX

Indonesian irrationality makes analysis of the situation difficult.

a. East Timor self-determination:

The opposition is unable to at present take a platform perceived as anti-national unity. It would destroy itself if it did. If a greater democratisation took place, self determination for East Timor could be advocated in a stronger manner. Even a referendum may be possible- but not now.

12 November made no change in this. There is criticism of the brutality of the armed forces, but the underlying problem of East Timor annexation is not discussed. The Dili massacre is simply decried as a symbol of the general excessive ABRI harshness towards Indonesian civilians.

b. Attitudes:

12 November was an eye-opener for many. The reports received in Jakarta re East Timor were always distorted ("constructed"), primarily by the military. There is an intellectual blockage in Jakarta which prevents leaders from grasping that the ET population is anti-Indonesian (the natural refusal by dictatorships to accept what runs counter to espoused ideologies).

The view persists that Fretilin are wild madmen which need to be killed. The anti-integration youths are merely considered manipulated and misguided people.

There is intolerance of minorities in Indonesia. They are not accepted as legitimate. Their importance is minimised and their aspirations rejected. If they pressure for rights, they are dismissed as manipulated by foreigners.

c. 12 November:

XXXX repeatedly warned the Government of the potential for violence that existed in connection with the Portuguese parliamentary visit, given the population's hostility to Indonesia.

Alatas, the liberal supporter of the Portuguese parliamentary visit, was unaware that the result of the visit could be a disastrously violent one, due to his lack of awareness of the true situation given that information reaching him is so distorted. XXXX warned him and other Ministers in advance, but was not believed. Now Alatas does not believe the military and seeks independent information. He was shattered by the XXXX report. They now believe XXXX reports, without really wanting to accept the reality .

The shooting of crowds was a normal ABRI response. They only know

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to respond in this way. They are unable to pacify, even after 16 years, their only response is to crush. A large demonstration such as the Dili one could not have possibly been allowed to proceed in Indonesia by the Army. Their natural first reaction would be: kill the people. Only afterwards did they realise that international opinion would not accept it. In response at first they tried to attack the press, and foreigners involved, not the Army itself.

d. Talks:

Alatas is in a weak position to take risks after the 12 November debacle. Alatas views Fretilin as only representing itself. Indonesia will never agree to talk directly to Fretilin, even after the 12 November events.

Rudini may be more open to talks with others. The army will not talk- the moment is wrong: they are still brooding over their November disgrace.

CSIS: doubtful as a venue for talks, even if Jusuf Wanandi has evolved greatly since 1975. Intelligent, more open to world than most, reads, travels, talks to his opponents.

e. Personalities:

Alatas is quite liberal. He took a great risk pushing for the Portuguese visit. Without the visit the incidents would have been lesser. His position vis-a-vis the military has been weakened by this failure. A major set back. He was badly informed.

Prabowo failed with the 83 talks as he was not credible. He felt insulted, taking harsh reprisals. Exacerbates conflicts with Intel.

Try Sutrisno has shown his lack of intelligence. Useless. Failed. BAIS was out of control with him. With Murdani it was controlled.

Benny Murdani hard and intelligent. Unlike other military understands realities.

Warrow was a good man. It is regrettable that he should have been changed.

Rudini perhaps someone to talk to. Not too thick. Showed a certain intelligence in handling the 12 November affair.

Carrascalao has good relations with Murdani, Alatas, Rudini. Never has there been anything negative heard about him: not corrupt, listens to people, etc.

f. Prospects for change in Indonesia:

None for Jakarta for 92/93. A rejuvenation of leaders may take place, e.g. Sudomo retired. Murdani still has a future, his relations with Soeharto have improved. He has power and can't be ignored. An assurance for minorities- a symbol of tolerance of diversity.

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g. Prospects for East Timor:

The future appears very difficult. The army will take a hard line. The 'love approach' Warrow took after the terrible year of 1989 is perceived as having allowed Fretilin to make political progress. An unofficial closure will take place, through greater controls. Timorese will be incited to be in conflict with one another. They will be ostensibly left to speak on behalf of the Government but if they digress from the script they will be silenced.

Development cant be done with combat troops present, at gunpoint. Incidents always happen where combat troops are placed.

h. Other:

XXXX would like to see Jose Ramos Horta when in XXXX next. [This would be useful given XXXX good knowledge of the East Timor and Indonesia situation]. He wishes to provide JRH some further background information on the history of XXXX involvement in Timor, lacking in the relevant chapter in JRH's book.

Advice criticism of Indonesia should be very precise. They use any ambiguities in critical reports to discredit the objectivity of such reports. Many rumours are generated in Timor- check carefully so as not to loose credibility.

a. Wako visit: a scandal! Will probably not see anything. Indonesia will flatter his ego, giving him pompous treatment. Tourism. Being racist as they are, will treat with hidden contempt. Is probably a Boutros Gali pay back.

b. Mau Hodu could as yet not be seen in Dili. Probably being tortured. New Commander appears cooperative- but proof of sincerity still to be seen.

c. Jakarta students:

►try to get as many foreign observers to trials as possible.

d. Asia Watch visit to Dili: could not do much- constantly under security observation.

XXXX...

XXXX appears increasingly critical and hostile towards Indonesia.

4. MARSILLAM SIMANJUNTAK - Forum Demokrasi member. Researcher, intellectual- 27/1/92

a. Military

Difficult for the military to disengage from East Timor now. It is a legacy of the Cold War, the making of the US and Australia. In the view of the military, they were pressured to intervene in East Timor to safeguard the integrity of the nation which was at risk, and to satisfy US and Australia. As a result of such legitimation, "every stupidity, pursuit of private interests etc. was allowed to take place without control". Now it is too late, the damage done is irreversible, the point of no return has been passed- at least while this regime is in power. **A reversal of policy would only be possible if the regime changes.**

Furthermore, there are other military vested interests in East Timor. Under the guise of ensuring national integrity, they benefit from active exercises, rising in rank, allocation of operational funds, personal businesses.

There is also the shame of having to withdraw acknowledging to have failed to crush a 'small group' of opponents after 15 years of effort.

Finally, there is the problem of other regions which may be stimulated to press for self-determination and secession if East Timor is allowed to go.

The Government refuses to acknowledge there is an equal opponent on the opposite side. Even towards Portugal the Indonesian Government/Military acts as though there is no problem- the de facto acknowledgment by Australia influences this.

b. Alatas

Alatas accepts that the problem is still there and tries to keep discussions with Portugal going. Not directly, which is felt to be awkward, but under UN Secretary general auspices. He tries to present the Army with a fait accompli on this, even if it displeases them.

The Parliamentary delegation was also presented by Alatas as a fait accompli to the military, which tried to prevent it. The backfiring has greatly damaged Alatas, weakening him with the military. The need for someone who can properly handle international condemnation has given Alatas an important role again.

c. 12 November

It is hoped that this affair will be of great value to work towards a change in the Indonesian government system. **It is essential that the strongest foreign pressure is kept on the regime. Western countries should not too quickly condone. Pressure should go on. This will be the only way to redress the mistake of US and Australia of 1975.**

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It was evident how Soeharto started to succumb to international pressure initially. He was truly afraid at first, thus allowing for the unprecedented National Commission of Inquiry show to be staged for international consumption. Regrettably however, just as the pressure was beginning to show results, western countries have decided to backtrack. This is most counterproductive. It not only affects the possible progress on East Timor and human rights, but strengthens Soeharto again. This is dangerous for the opposition, which will be now attacked by Soeharto with renewed strength. A major setback for the pro-democracy opposition.

A maximum of international pressure should be applied on the Government, for the benefit of East Timor and for the benefit of democratisation of Indonesia in general. It should be sustained.

d. Prospects for change:

To change the East Timor situation need to change the Indonesian regime, for this need to change Soeharto. He is the policy maker. In a pyramidal system, change can occur only if he is changed. This is why it has been so regrettable that foreign states stopped their pressure when it was starting to yield results recently.

A pessimistic view would expect change by 1998. An optimistic one expects it to happen in not too long a time. In 93 there will be change, but perhaps not too systematic, visible or open.

His own personal view is that **there is a distinct possibility for change to take place in 1993. There could well be a 'surprise'.**

Foreign diplomats think his view is quixotic, but such people are contaminated by the way the helpless and resigned Indonesians think- yet they consider themselves to be 'understanding the Indonesian way'. Those who are aware of the work the opposition is performing would see that there is reason to be optimistic about change possibility.

e. Talks:

[it appears that he does not favour any possible resolution of the East Timor problem with the present government, given the usefulness of this issue as a weapon for the opposition]

He has no confidence that talks on East Timor will bring any results now. The military are not willing talk at present. This leaves civilians only. These are too afraid, and have no power. Therefore, a diplomatic solution is at present impossible to envisage. Conditions would have to change first, i.e. the regime must fall. He would welcome diplomatic solutions then.

Benny is impossible to talk to. Nationalistic, is not open to foreigners, will not listen to their advice. Proud, ambitious, wishes to outwit his rivals. Alatas is OK if left alone, but he is not allowed to move. Useless to talk to him now.

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f. Prabowo:

Hostile to East Timor in the extreme. Opposes Benny in every way. A very ambitious, vindictive and dedicated person driven by some profound hostility. Takes a strong pro-Islam position to oppose Catholics (Benny). Could the explanation lie in the alleged mutilation (of his genitals) which he is said to have experienced years ago in East Timor? The fact that he is so far childless would point to this- the family is said to be considering adopting a child.

►Could any one advise MS of any evidence of such mutilation? He very much wishes to confirm this.

MARSILLAM SIMANJUNTAK, 5/2/92

Only two paradigms for East Timor exist: independence or 27th Province. The present government accepts only the second. They may change their implementation policies, but not the status.

►There is need for international pressure. The strongest possible pressure. Only this will produce the changes needed.

International pressure was beginning to produce results, Soeharto was beginning to falter. Then it diminished.

Now Soeharto appears to regain strength.

This is dangerous for the opposition. Soeharto will be strengthened and will dare to crack down on opposition. This is bad for democratisation.

►Do not weaken the pressure to bring Soeharto down. Only a new group in government would allow East Timor independence.

5. VICTORIA BRANDT - Foreign resident , 27/1/92

Is an independent supporter of East Timorese in Jakarta, having performed invaluable work to assist with communications and welfare, particularly of recent student detainees.

a. Detainees:

The Legal Assistance Foundation (LBH) lawyers handling the case of the 70 detained students after the 19 November demonstration seem not very efficient: slow and not thorough.

As a result of pressure 49 signed a statement of apology to Soeharto and acceptance of integration, and were released.

Those which have not signed so far remain detained under Court order at the Central Police station. The conditions of detention are shocking. Bad food, poor hygiene, isolation. The health of the detainees is rapidly deteriorating. No charges have been made, except for two of 21. No trial dates are set, even if legally admissible detention dates have been already exceeded.

It is necessary to get maximum international pressure criticising these detentions and the conditions under which they are taking place, particularly since Indonesia is extremely sensitive to international pressure at present.

Should ensure that **maximum possible number of foreigners observe the trials** if and when these take place (Jakarta based foreign diplomats, media, and others specially visiting to observe).

b. Netherlands Embassy:

The Netherlands Embassy is most uncooperative with East Timorese in Jakarta wishing to get Portuguese passports. The students who sought asylum there several years back have still not been given their passports. **Netherlands Embassy officials deliberately created obstacles to prevent it. Even if the passport were issued, they claimed they hadn't arrived.** Victoria has evidence of it.

Now some of those people are in jail again. They wish to be tried as Portuguese citizens, but haven't got the passports to prove their status.

►Jose Ramos Horta is requested to take this up urgently with Portuguese Foreign Affairs.

Acknowledgment of the Portuguese status of the prosecuted will clearly help to internationalise the trials and be beneficial all around.

►A long term solution to the recurring problem of Dutch Embassy lack of cooperation and good will in Jakarta should be sought.

c. Funds:

Much expense is being incurred in assisting Timorese students in Jakarta, many of which have lost their scholarships and have no means of sustenance. Particularly those in jail need food, vitamin and medical support. Expenses are also incurred with

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regards to legal support. Funds are coming from Australia, and she is also raising some money among supportive foreigners in Indonesia.

►Greater funds need to be provided to Victoria urgently.

In connection with the 19 of November detentions, the irresponsible behaviour of the UN personnel, who exhibited total disinterest to receive the petition handed to them by Timorese students needs to be censored. This prompted the petitioners to proceed to the Japanese and Australian Embassies, where gates were closed on them. Arrests followed.

d. Indonesian disinformation:

Victoria mentioned her experience as German language teacher of Indonesian diplomatic trainees. Her students confided details of their work, which shows how they are being trained in disinformation, aimed particularly at discrediting Portugal. They use details in Amnesty International reports and others, which they then distort. Each officer as assigned a foreign Embassy in Jakarta, which they flood with note verbales creating false images about East Timor. This is then reported by embassies to their Governments, creating false images and mis perceptions about the problem. Such officers even claimed to have had to assist in the 'construction' of the National Commission of Inquiry report.

6. JOSE AMORIN- East Timorese student in Jakarta , 27/1/92

a. Detained students

The spirits of the students are still high despite the difficulties faced. The authorities are afraid of the influence Timorese militancy may have on other local people, who could also be incited to rebel against oppressive conditions. They are also worried about foreign criticism. Thus they proceed carefully. Nonetheless, the conditions of detention are appalling, and exceed legally permissible periods. Police investigation to prepare dossiers was under duress and without legal help being provided.

The fact that some students signed apologies for the 19 november demonstration must be clearly understood. It must be noted that **signature of this statement was under duress and should in no way be taken on face value. They have not changed their position.** They merely tried to get released, as they realised that if all were convicted, it would greatly damage the resistance work.

The two people held as leaders (Fernando Araujo and Joao da Silva ##??) who have meanwhile been formally accused as subversives, have taken their predicament with peace and serenity. They did not respond to attempts made to get them to change their position. Others have been tempted with all sorts of promises : autonomy for East Timor, gifts, jobs, clothes etc. **International pressure should not weaken. It helps greatly.**

As a result of the fact that LBH lawyers appear as not very effective, and that they only look at the problem as an Indonesian -primarily human civil rights- one, the students do not feel much confidence with their lawyers. Thus some want to prepare their own defence, modelled on the Bandung (and originally Sukarno) trials, as platforms for criticising Government policies. They furthermore wish to be tried as foreigners (Portuguese).

[It would appear that their legal skills to do this successfully under the difficult conditions they face may be too limited- they need help]

►all possible ways to internationalise the matter should be explored.

b. Funds

There is an acute need for funds. Both for the detained students and for those released but whose scholarships have been discontinued. Everyone is under constant surveillance, which makes their lives difficult and expensive. They are seen as dangerous influences on Indonesians. It is claimed that military people may want to eliminate them, thus they should be under court custody.

They would like some funds to learn some skills that enable them to set up profit-making activities so that they can eventually generate the funds they need for their resistance work.

►More funds are needed for communications, faxes etc.

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c. Jose Amarin is doing very valuable work in public relations with foreigners as well. He is one of the very few Timorese who has contacts with foreign diplomats in Jakarta. This is invaluable as it serves to countervail official propaganda and disinformation. This work should be increased, but the obstacles to do so are many.

Obtaining employment as local staff in a foreign embassy may be a great help. One, it would appear to legitimise his contact with foreigners, which at present is very risky for him due to Intel surveillance. Two, it would give a measure of protection (Intel fears of their harassment being exposed internationally). Three, it would give greater access to foreign diplomats, communications, information. Four, it would provide an income.

►Could JRH urgently appeal to friendly states to see if they can employ him as local administrative staff?

His command of Portuguese and Indonesian could be valuable to a Lusophone Embassy (eg. the newly opening Mozambican, the Brazilian, or even attachment to the Netherlands one, paid by Portugal. This could be a way to improve the present difficulties of servicing Timorese. The salary wouldn't need to be more than about \$200 or so per month!)

LEMBAGA BANTUAN HUKUM LBH (Indonesian Legal Aid Foundation)

7. ABDUL HAKIM GARUDA NUSANTARA - Chairman LBH , 28/1/92

a. Talks:

The Government does not want to talk at present about East Timor with resistance groups. Opposition groups outside the Government therefore won't dare to talk either, and least of all would they dare to lobby.

LBH has no access to Government, not listened to. As a human rights organisation it has limitations at present to get involved in the issue of self-determination of East Timor, even if it can understand the wish for it. Petisi 50 is no use as has no influence. Need to involve some powerful people such as Jakob Utama of Kompas, General Sumitro, Aristides Katoppo of Suara Pembaruan, the Chief Editor of this paper who may be close to Army. Charis Suhud###- The Speaker of Parliament who has a moderate stance and is listened to by many.

b. Intimidation of NGO's as a result of 12 November:

Indonesian Government political propaganda is being used to intimidate and discredit local NGO's. Government propaganda creates fear against NGO's by constantly mentioning about involvement of foreign NGO's in the Dili incidents.

Community Aid Abroad for example have been accused by Indonesian Government to have provided money and having been involved in organising East Timor demonstrations. There has been no official rejection of these charges by CAA. Even if only some indirect mention was made in newspapers,

►CAA should officially reply rejecting these charges. Do not be too legalistic or formalistic on this.

►CAA Public Relations should write articles in Indonesian papers, informing what their objectives here are, thus providing information to government officials about its humanitarian and developmental work.

This rejection is important, as the Indonesian Government is using these allegations as a way to intimidate local NGO's. This should be countered. With the limited information available in Indonesia, Government propaganda creates fear against NGO's.

c. Student trials:

Has seen some, his lawyers see them frequently while in care of prosecutor. Possibly not all will be brought to trial- the cases will just be dropped! The 2 leaders will certainly be tried. Conditions are OK, even if they complain about food. They are allowed permits for family visitors twice weekly. Also by lawyers. They have appointed LBH to defend them.

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João Camara has Portuguese passport and Indonesian ID card. If he wishes to be tried as a foreigner, it will still be for breach of Indonesian law in Indonesia. To be tried as foreigner will only create confusion.

Foreign observers to the trials will greatly help. LBH can not be seen as requesting this in any way however!

8. LUHUT PANGARIBUAN - LBH lawyer assigned to Timorese student defence, 28/1/92

[Do not attribute this information to LBH publicly in any way! If needs be, say " Jakarta District Attorney, or Police sources..."]

a. Dili detainees:

There is no access to Dili detainees at present. Once trials dates are known, LBH plans to send lawyers from Jakarta - this is expensive.

b. Jakarta detainees:

Of the 70 detained at 19 November demonstrations, part has been released without charges, after signing a statement of loyalty to Indonesia. Rest are in police custody on behalf of the District Attorney (DA). No charges made yet. Two possibilities exist, one, that they are charged under the anti-subversion act, two, that they are charged for criminal offences. Alternatively, they could all be released and charges dropped. Luhut has met the DA twice, but he does not know what will be chosen. The General Attorney will decide the charges. No clear basis on which to ground this decision is apparent. No explanations are given. It is obvious that the Government wishes to extract a statement that they agree with integration.

At the DA they were handed by Police to Public prosecutor. Luhut was refused permission to meet all detainees. Could only meet 7 in front of several public prosecutors, where they signed powers of attorney for LBH to defend them. It is difficult for LBH to interview them. Others wish to defend themselves. Public prosecutor promised they would be released without conditions if they made pro-integration statements.

Students from Bali are charged with possession of explosive materials. In Jakarta the accusation is likely to be acts against public order, and spreading of hatred feelings. Fernando from Bali is seen as the leader. Moved to Jakarta.

Conditions of detention are poor. Food is bad and affects their health. No clothes. No medical doctors are available- the one who should be on service is currently on a training course, and no replacement is provided. LBH has had to give money for additional food and is arranging for outside doctor.

Visits by LBH to detainees are difficult. Even if they are told they can come, in practice the police makes it difficult. Visits by relatives are also difficult, requiring permits each time

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which are time consuming to get.

Police investigated the detainees to prepare the prosecution dossiers without allowing them assistance of lawyers. The dossiers should therefore not be considered legitimate. The information was extracted under duress.

Maximum allowable detention periods are being exceeded, and no date for trials have been set. It is clearly inconvenient to hold trials at present, and it is hoped that most will sign the pro-integration statements in the end. Only a small core will be tried, to set an example.

c. International pressure:

East Timor is a special case, unlike Lampung, Aceh etc. There is great Government sensitivity to international pressure. The Government tries to appear as especially kind (e.g. Luhut complained to DA that detainees never changed clothes since 19 November- the next day they were issued new clothes). Therefore **this factor should be used to the utmost so as to help the detainees.**

►Letters should be written to Indonesian Government, District Attorney and General Attorney complaining of the poor conditions of detention, exceeding of legally allowed detention periods, lack of clear charges, difficulties of access of legal assistance, lack of validity of Police investigation etc.

Bp. Jaksa Agung RI,
Kejaksaan Agung Republik Indonesia
Jalan Hasanuddin
Kebayoran Baru
Jakarta Selatan

Bp. Jaksa Tinggi Jakarta,
Kejaksaan Tinggi Jakarta
Jalan Rasuna Said
Kuningan
Jakarta Pusat

►A maximum number of foreign observers should attend the trials. Jakarta based foreign diplomats, news media correspondents, public. Special observers should come if possible.

Note: particularly for the Dili trials this should be endeavoured. [perhaps a delegation from Darwin, as cheaper?]

LUHUT PANGARIBUAN, 5/2/92

Two students, Joao Freitas Camara and Fernando Araujo, considered leaders, have been charged under the anti-subversion law. Fernando is under great pressure and very sick. His condition has greatly deteriorated since Luhut last saw him. They are kept separately. They show no signs of torture, but of the poor conditions they are under. They complain of poor food, no

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communication with family, no letters reach them. Need Catholic religious services. Need medical care, but the doctor is away on a course!).

Some of those who signed the apology statement, expecting to be released as promised, now wish to withdraw the statement. They feel cheated as they have not been released.

The General Attorney does not know when trials will begin. These detentions thus exceed legally allowed limits, which are: 20 days in Police custody, extendable a further 40 days. 20 days in Attorney's custody extendable by 30 days. i.e. a total of 110 days. The latest extension requested (to 15 March) brings the total to 120 days.

For the two accused of subversion the allowable limits are 1 year plus 110 days.

9. Ir. INDRO CAHAYONO- Infight, Human Rights NGO, 28/1/92

a. Government disinformation regarding East Timor:

The Indonesian public is totally ignorant regarding the true nature of the East Timor problem. For 16 years have been presented with disinformation. The base assumption is that Indonesia 'liberated' East Timor from Portuguese colonialism. The annexation is legitimised this way.

b. Need for information campaign:

The wrong base assumptions legitimising the annexation, held by the misinformed public must be changed.

A bulletin 'Berita Timor Timur' is being published at present. It circulates among students etc.

Infight's motivations are two-fold: one, to promote acceptance of a new ideology sensitive to self-determination and, two, to expose the horrors of 'the monster's' past policies (i.e Soeharto!).

i). Publication of a book in Indonesian: containing among others a contribution by East Timorese leaders such as Jose Ramos Horta would be valuable. Should be presented as part of a wider theme of freedom, and not specifically only on East Timor, to avoid early banning. Could even include interviews with ex-military.

ii). Seminar: could be on the general theme of self-determination, including self-determination over natural resources (a current Indonesian problem). Again, better to make it general, including East Timor as one relevant topic rather than specific and having it banned outright. Indro will contact LIPI people for possible organisation.

A further theme which could be acceptable could be how to appropriately respond to avoid threats of economic sanctions or aid cuts. A number of academics could perhaps be willing to work on this, e.g: Iwan Jaya Agus (?) at University of Indonesia Economics Faculty, Sjahrir (ex PSI), Rizal Ramli, Post Graduate teacher at UI.

The underlying aim would be to show that political and economic opportunities for Indonesia won't diminish if East Timor is allowed independence, rather the contrary.

iii). need to expose media people and students to the East Timor truth.

►They need to be provided material on the true history of East Timor annexation, to countervail the official versions.

►They need information on Timor Gap - particularly regarding any military involvement.

iv). Current situation, aftermath of 12 November:

The government is questioning its policies in East Timor as a result of this debacle. This presents an opportunity to show how an East Timor independence needs not to be detrimental to

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Indonesian interests.

►Use this opportunity

An entry point could be through training a group to force a debate on East Timor to start. For this need latest information material available abroad.

v). Talks:

There is use for talks on East Timor.

The military are closed on this at present however.

PETITION OF 50 GROUP:**10. CHRIS SINER KEY TIMU- 28/1/92****a. East Timor:**

The P50 acknowledges that East Timor integration is not legitimate as the people of East Timor did not carry out a valid act of self-determination, even if constitutionally it is considered the 27th Province. [contrast this with Ali Sadikin below]. The current difficulties are seen to be the consequence of past unjust policies.

Positions on East Timor vary:

i) PNI (the old nationalists): they see it in a narrow nationalist manner, it is OK for ET to be integrated. Human rights and self-determination are not a concern.

ii) Islamic groups: Integration of ET is seen to facilitate spreading of Islam in this Catholic region. So are in favour.

iii) Progressive intellectuals valuing respect for human rights: Gross violations of human rights have taken place in East Timor. Once Soeharto is out, East Timor should be allowed independence.

iv) Indonesian people in general: are aware that there are great injustices taking place in East Timor (especially after 12 November), and that this should be corrected. However there is little knowledge of the actual history and the case for independence.

v) Government

No one inside Government dares to talk re East Timor. Afraid to be marginalised if oppose ruling policies.

vi) Civilian leaders

Those outside Government, especially those concerned with human rights do dare to call for change.

vii) Some individuals

Abdurrachman Wahid: A most valuable Islamic leader with a most tolerant orientation. Unique.

Ben Mboi: Tolerant, open, acknowledges past failure, advocate of reform. But shares the military trauma about all the ABRI members who have died. Giving up East Timor would mean deaths were in vain.

Ret.Gen. Sumitro: a good thermometer to measure the ABRI temperature.

Prof. Delia Noor: Islam scientist, useful.

Ret. Gen. Saijidiman: specialist advisor to Minister Habibie. Articulates military thinking.

Others: Soebadio, Charis Suhud, Sjamsuddin, Rukmini.

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b. Talks:

Need to slowly advance step by step with military. Not prepared at present, especially after 12 November failure.

A seminar may be better now. If open it would attract more attention, especially media, but needs a permit which may be difficult. A limited seminar would not require permits.

CSIS: Soeharto doesn't really listen to them, as they don't 100% support him. They are kept for diplomatic international public relations, as a contact point for foreigners. Suara Karya is their media mouthpiece.

c. Indonesian politics:

Parliament at present is useless. Not only because of the poor quality of the people, but the system does not allow them to express themselves. The Fractions determine. They have to lobby the Golkar DPP whose head is Soeharto.

Succession:

Usually Golkar announces its endorsement of Soeharto as Presidential candidate a year before the elections. The meeting last October didn't, and to date they have not endorsed him. Soeharto is the greatest obstacle to reform towards democracy. **There may well occur a major surprise as 1993 approaches.**

d. Dili detainees:

LPK, a human rights foundation in which Chris Siner is active is trying to find lawyers to defend those in Dili. Otherwise they will have no legal aid. He closely cooperates with H. Prinsen on this.

11. Ret. Let. Gen. ALI SADIKIN- 31/1/92**a. East Timor:**

He is for integration of East Timor into Indonesia. East Timor could not be initially treated the same as other provinces, as it had a different colonial experience and does not share some of the Indonesian independence struggle motivations. However a different colonial history is not by itself cause for incompatibility to be part of Indonesia. Bengkulu was British before, Singapore was Dutch at one time. Other areas of Indonesia were Portuguese in the past. The problem lies in the way integration was implemented. He acknowledges that the way it was done is a disgrace. It is understandable if East Timorese see Indonesia as the enemy. The failure is made even more evident by the fact that young people are anti-integration. The bad mistakes of the past need to be corrected. New policies which take into account regional identity need to be put in place. Also in other places like Aceh etc. For this need pressure.

Soeharto is behind murders in East Timor, and Benny's exploitation with Chinese businesses. This cant be allowed to go on. Need to keep pressure on.

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b. Role of international pressure:

► **International pressure must go on. Don't stop. Foreign NGOs should continue pressing reluctant governments to continue pressing hard on Indonesia.**

"It is shameful that Western governments are so weak, and go out of their way to accept this murderer [Soeharto]". Australia appears particularly afraid of Soeharto.

Ali Sadikin does not understand why the international outcry limits itself to the massacres of East Timor, when equally brutal events took place in Tanjung Priok in 1984 and others (Lampung, Aceh, etc). Is this some indication of international discrimination to favour Christians (East Timor) and neglect Moslems? Are Moslem lives less valuable? Many ask themselves this question, he added.

► This appearance of imbalance should be avoided.

► **There should be strongest possible international pressure regarding these other massacres and HR violations as well.**

The KPN (National Commission of Inquiry Report) is a farce. Yet tragically the West is prepared to accept it. Should not. This is the first time Soeharto's murders have been exposed. Yet they have happened so often in the past.

c. General Sjaffei:

His comments regarding the capture of Mau Hodu give a bad impression of his mentality (as caught by a Sergeant, is below his dignity to talk to). It forecasts a bad future.

d. Detained in Jakarta and Dili:

Should be let free. What is the point of trials? This only raises more hate and conflict.

e. Indonesian attitudes:

Many in Indonesia share Ali Sadikin's views on East Timor, but few dare to come out publicly. At the right moment, when feel safe, many will come out with these views.

f. Soeharto :

Is a murderer. He is the one that launched PETRUS (mysterious killings) in Indonesia and East Timor. He won't live for ever, and the system he has built will collapse.

Democracy is needed in Indonesia. The Armed Forces are used to oppress however. At one stage they will lose control and refuse to shoot their own people. At present they are still loyal. The control apparatus is still good.

The rulers have the limitless arrogance of feudal lords at present. In such a feudal system there is no dialogue.

Soeharto has still a strong group of followers whose support he buys. They help one another. This will go on still, particularly if supported by the West. This should stop.

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►NGOs should continue being active to get Governments to stop supporting.

g. Talks:

The ruling groups still too arrogant. Civilians too scared. Jose ramos Horta is still seen as too much of an enemy here. Could probably not be initially involved. Intermediaries would be needed. Perhaps Australian?

advice: see Professor Selo Sumarjan.
Gen Sumitro has an echo in ABRI.

11. Ret. Marshall SUYITNO SUKIRNO- Ex Ambassador to Australia - 5/2/92

a. East Timor:

Supports East Timor aspirations, and understands the bad treatment they have experienced from Indonesia. East Timorese should have been accepted, should have been given a feeling of sympathy, not the opposite. In such a case integration would have proceeded differently.

b. Soeharto :

A thief (perampok), who has not kept his promise. He criticised his predecessor's mistakes, but when his comrades-in-arms (i.e Sukirno, Sadikin, etc) reminded him of his promises, for the good of the state, he shut them out. All they are doing is reminding him of what he promised when he was entrusted with leadership. Now unprecedented levels of corruption and oppression, in collusion with Chinese, have been reached.

The west supports him. Basically to continue exploiting Indonesia. Australia is naive in its assessment of Indonesia.

c. Solutions:

There is no point to attempt to dialogue with Soeharto. He must be made to fall.

This is difficult to achieve wholly from within. Needs army/civilian cooperation.

Outside pressure is needed.

►**Need to expose the Soeharto atrocities: East Timor massacres and Tanjung Priok and others.**

►**East Timor supporters should join other opponents of Soeharto abroad to maximise pressure.**

i.e. all should join to maximise pressure due to Human Rights violations.

With Tanjung Priok there were in excess of 200 killed. The population knows where the graves are. This scandal needs to be exposed first. Later others.

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14. Ret. Lt Gen Dr BEN MBOI- 29/1, 5/2, 7/2/92
ex Governor of NTT Province, Golkar executive, respected by Soeharto, advisor to Benny Murdani. Involved since 1965 in moves to integrate Timor into Indonesia.

[Ben Mboi is a very open, western educated, austere sincere and honest person. A Catholic from Flores. A Medical Doctor who now specialises in Regional Government and Development matters. Just returned from studies at Leiden and Harvard. He is clearly disenchanted with the current situation and the behaviour of the Soeharto clique. Has not criticised them openly yet however, Merely distances himself from them.]

The contents of this interview, given in the confidence of an old personal friendship may in no way be attributed or used in a way that is identifiable.

a. East Timor integration history:

In 1965 the Portuguese Government asked the Dili Bishop to approach Indonesian Bishops upon his return from Vatican II to see how Timor could be disposed of, as Portugal's new problems in Africa required full attention. Mboi, a medical Dr. in Ende, joined the meeting with the Bishops. Portugal had assessed several scenarios, from independence to integration with Mozambique or Macao. The most favoured one was integration with Indonesia. Mboi went to Jakarta on 12 March 1965, to inform Soeharto of this -they day after the transfer of power from Soekarno. The new leader was against annexing Timor, as it would jeopardise the legitimacy of the Irian Barat annexation, where an 'Act of Free Choice' had still to take place. He feared Indonesia may loose Irian Barat as a result.

In 1971 while Mboi was studying in Brussels, Antonio Pinto da França, ex Consul General to Jakarta and Portuguese Ambassador to NATO, told his friend the daughter of Indonesian presidential advisor Roeslan Abdulgani, also a student in Brussels, that a Superpower (the USSR!) was trying to obtain influence in Portuguese Timor so as to build up a base there. She reported it to her father. This is seen as yet another Portuguese attempt to get Indonesia to annex the Province. A number of people (including Ben Mboi, Dr Fernandes- current NTT Governor, etc.) began to learn Portuguese for eventual service in Timor.

After the April 75 Lisbon coup, Mboi and a group in Kupang declared the integration of Portuguese Timor. They were rebuked by Adam Malik and other leaders, who told them not to interfere in foreign policy matters.

In early 1980s, while Mboi was Governor of NTT, Benny Murdani and the Interior Minister instructed him to prepare to absorb Oecussi into the NTT administration. Mboi checked with Soeharto who did not allow it. He said "what does it matter to be 5 or 10 years delayed in the development of that region? We better wait for the whole process [of integration] to be properly finished with Portugal first. This way we will allow the Portuguese to finalise their history on East Timor properly. The history of a nation is

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very important and needs to be respected". [i.e. Soeharto allegedly wished for the East Timor problem to be resolved with Portugal first, before making administrative changes].

b. Portugal's attitude:

Mboi sees the East Timor problem as a purely Portuguese-Indonesian dispute, unresolvable while the two states lay claim to the territory in their respective Constitutions. Portugal is inconsistent and erratic. As the poorest nation in Europe, it should be taking care of its own people's welfare rather than allocating resources to a distant problem. Mboi claims that during his recent residence in Europe he was contacted by several Portuguese who disagree with their Government's current policy on this.

It needs to be remembered that Portugal abandoned East Timor. It also did not prepare Timorese to run a government, leaving it with no capable people. This is a problem to this day: Indonesia has no capable allies there to assist facing the opponents. Local government is not legitimate.

c. Current Indonesian politics:

Mboi is very critical of Soeharto excesses now. Succession will be difficult. Soeharto will attempt to stay on as he needs to protect his personal business interests, but is being rejected. There is resistance in the army, they want change. Soeharto's family's limitless greed is incomprehensible: they feel it is their right. His staying on threatens national integrity. [jokes were made about the possibility of an East Indonesian State being therefore perhaps finally possible- it is unprecedented that such a thought be articulated. A sign of the changing times!]

Mrs Mboi, running as Golkar candidate for Parliament, mentioned the new atmosphere in campaign meetings. For the first time members question and challenge what they don't approve. There is criticism and rejection of explanations from above which try to cover up inadmissible matters. The election promises to be different this time therefore!

d. 12 November:

The government will never accept a reversal of the integration policy. Too much was invested. The cost has been too high- the loss of face would be too great. They are trying to skilfully cover up the 12 November incident, which is **an indication of failures of past policies.**

Soeharto earned great resentment by personally dismissing officers. He should have merely given instructions to the system to do so, but he wished to show the International Community that he is still in charge, so as to defuse criticism and be re-ingratiated. It is **a sign of weakness: he cant possibly afford to risk foreign funding cuts,** particularly with present economic downturn, elections etc.

The 12 November incident was a failure of the civilian administration, leading to an overreaction of the military

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administration. A deviation from manuals.

There are two manuals in administrative use. The Governor takes responsibility for civilian disturbances (where no weapons are involved), assisted by Police. If the crisis involves armed disturbers, the Military commander is responsible. In East Timor, given the relative weakness of the civilian administration, the military is predominant. They handled the disturbance with their means, which usually tend to be over reactive.

The 12 November was a questioning of the sociological integration of East Timor. It may have been a blessing in disguise, pointing out that there has been something wrong in the administration of ET.

e. Integration implementation:

Integration has been mishandled. **A socio-cultural approach rather than a power-based one should have been used.**

There is a basic misconception regarding ET: that it is equal to the other provinces. It isn't. Sociological realities are different, this must be taken into consideration.

Fretilin is not a separatist movement. It is a movement of people which didn't choose to integrate. The programs to 'suppress insurgency' are therefore misplaced.

The problem is one of socio-cultural integration which has not been achieved- East Timorese have not yet integrated as one province, let alone as part of Indonesia. It needs a human approach rather than a military approach. Persuasion, rather than intimidation. Sociological integration would legitimate political integration.

There are technical problems for this however:

i) the agency used for human approach was the provincial government apparatus made out of remnants of the Portuguese one (UDT). This was a mistake, given the cleavage in East Timorese society. Apodeti and UDT, who saw Fretilin as enemies, influenced Indonesia. Fretilin should not be seen as enemies but as political opponents which need to be persuaded to come over. I.e. Indonesia misperceived the situation. It was influenced by local divisions. The UDT people in the provincial government are incapable of a human approach towards Fretilin. In Aceh etc. a reconciliation is possible as this problem is absent.

ii) a second problem was the lack of human resources available to set up a government. Need to develop human resources. Intellectual capacity, develop a political elite, a bureaucracy.

iii) Excessive speed to change in the local administrative system, exacerbated by the insistence to set up a complex structure like in all other provinces. In Portuguese times it was not an autonomous province. Now it is. Regencies even are. The Provincial Assembly (DPR) should have been merely an advisory council. It ended up looking as a comedy. There is no administrative culture. It took Indonesia 45 years to develop

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one, having started even before that in Java under the Dutch. No transition time was allowed in East Timor. The social and political system there was too quickly demolished.

Indonesia tried too soon to convey the image that East Timor was a province like all the rest. Had to put unqualified locals up in front to govern, needing to back them up from behind. This was a cumbersome obstacle. Should have given it special region status, set up a more centralised local government (no need for Regencies etc) subject to special laws. The Governor should have had wider range of powers, and levels below him abolished, as no qualified people exist to make proper decisions at regency level. This problem could still be corrected giving it a 'special region' status. It however needs the right people, not just officials who abuse their positions.

iv) As there was no technical administrative capacity, no spirit in the government, development became difficult. The result was that the military administration took over, taking a higher profile than it should have. This was not on purpose however. The result of the fact that no countervailing civilian power existed. The civil mission of ABRI is only supportive, not an alternative to civilians.

v) Another present problem are the people flooding in from elsewhere in Indonesia. They displace the East Timorese. Murdani was against opening Timor at first, precisely so as to avoid this. But he was opposed by many, and accused of protecting his own business interests, so he yielded. Now he takes an 'I told you so' attitude and cant do anything to correct it.

When it was closed there were many evils, but it was easier to control the abuse of a limited number of people. Now all sorts of people come in- hard to control evils. Outside settlers should not be allowed there. If had professional administrators rather than political choices, could still control access.

f. International dimension:

The 12 November was a questioning of the real integration, therefore opened possibility to question the international dimension. Until there is an Indonesia/Portugal solution, any event in ET will be read as a political event. As long as ET is in the Constitution of Portugal, there will be the political problem of a territory in dispute. There is thus a need for an effort on the international level for Portugal to let ET loose. Need to bargain. Indonesia will certainly not turn back the clock. But Indonesia also wishes to have good relations with other nations- it wishes to have a gentlemen's agreement with Portugal to resolve this issue. Portugal however is the poorest state in Europe, the government needs an issue to distract the attention of the people- thus its stance on ET. Yet there is a silent majority of sympathisers with Indonesia in Portugal, who consider Timor a past issue. Only Fretilin is very vocal. Indonesia should meet with Portugal as soon as possible, for the benefit of all of us. Indonesia needs to make clear that it

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wishes to close the problem in a good way [dengan baik], but there is no question of turning back the clock.

g. Talks/seminar:

Indonesians won't be willing to speak abroad, for political reasons. Except at a closed seminar. Need to get people who truly understand the issue. People who really wish to resolve the ET problem, not merely powerwise [ie. no obstinate military], as it cant be solved that way. Need a sociological analysis and solution.

h. Mario Carrascalão:

A good man but a technocrat. No contact with the people. A Governor must have contact with the people, be liked, have charisma. Mario writes 10,000 memorandums locked up in his office. Others could do this, not the Governor. Need to be a head of the area, not a head of the office. He compares East Timor to other provinces, wishing to reach same level as them. It is necessary for East Timor to advance at the speed allowed by its people. **There is still a lack of human resources. The most acute problem now is who is to succeed Carrascalão.** [He felt that Lopes da Cruz may have a good chance].

i. Future:

Given that de jure and de facto integration have been achieved, but socio-cultural integration has not yet been completed, the next government will have to set up a 10 year blueprint for development, not only physically but socio-culturally.

Ben Mboi fears however that there are no people who are prepared to do this, or who understand the problems of East Timor. Statements by the Interior Minister for example lack depth on this.

The big problem with the Indonesian system is that the bureaucracy feels it is on top and has all the answers. It will not ask for outside advice, and rejects such. The Javanese political culture is dysfunctional. People do not dare to ask for advice, or acknowledge a good idea, even if often they silently end up taking it on afterwards.

15. AGUS RUMANSARA- INGGI, 30/1/92

[As an 'outsider' from Irian Jaya, needing to remain acceptable to the power elite, he appears as extremely careful of his public image]

a. Human rights and self determination:

In INGGI there is almost no one daring to talk about East Timor self-determination, even if they do not agree with the annexation. They only dare to speak out about human rights abuses. It is at present not viable to talk about self-determination with those in power, they wouldn't accept it. Their definition of human rights excludes self-determination.

Thus, in general INGGI's strategy is to only speak about 'human rights', until such time as it becomes viable to talk about self-determination explicitly. In future, the definition of 'human rights' can always be extended to include self determination at the appropriate time.

(Meanwhile, while talking under the guise of improving human rights, tries to prepare cadres for self determination for Irian/Papua etc.).

►To speed up being able to talk about self-determination: continue exerting the maximum possible international pressure on the regime. Intensify the present international campaign for human rights in Indonesia.

b. Coordination of opposition:

► To bring down the regime, resistance activities by W. Papuans, East Timorese, Acehnese should be coordinated. Should be linked to Islamic and other opposition actions in Indonesia, especially Jakarta. This way opposition will gather a momentum that will escape controlling power of ABRI.

c. People to see:

Abdurrachman Wahid. Mulya Lubis.

Hakim Garuda Nusantara privately does not agree with East Timor annexation.

Prinsen, Indro: were exhaustively questioned for organising November demonstrations. Are perceived to have disclosed much information. Thus are less valuable now. Feeling insecure with Indro, a new breakaway environmental group was formed.

d. Agus R. was very concerned to keep confidentiality. As a Melanesian he feels he must be particularly careful to keep an appearance of neutrality and good will towards Javanese authorities. This is an important aspect to keep in mind when contacting him in public.

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16. Dr. BURHAN MAGENDA- Political Scientist, Lecturer UI, Faculty of Social and Political Sciences. 31/1/92

a. Raise the level of the debate on East Timor:

It is now a good time to start a debate. 12 November has produced a questioning about the past policies. There is agreement that policies are not working and need new ones.

►Therefore, keep the debate going. With academics, media and NGOs.

i) Should increase NGO involvement in East Timor debates. Not only foreign but Indonesian ones as well. Include local Jakarta people with access to business and governing elite.

Some NGOs to include : Bima Swadaya(?), WALHI, (Zulkarnaen), Bina Desa, Kartjono(?) (Otista II)- these have so far not had projects in East Timor.

Through such bodies, East Timorese views could be channelled to the bureaucracy, as the East Timorese themselves have no access to the central bureaucracy.

ii) Media to contact

TEMPO Fikri Juffri###, Goenawan Mohammed.

Editor Sahur Hutabarat

Kompas Agus Parengkuan, Marcel Beding

Suara Pembaruan Aristides Katopo, Samuel Pardede

Surya ATI(?)- has Jakarta office, reporters went to ET.

Jawa Pos Sukardi

Media Indonesia Benny Harman

These all influence policy making through their writings. Cultivate them.

Reporters are generally more open minded than higher staff.

iii) Military

Difficult. Have pre-conceived ideas. Some in BAIS may be innovative. But generally are set in the 'Wawasan Nusantara' concept.

iv) Bureaucracy

Some Government Officials would like policy changes, but they don't dare on their own to express it as yet. They need an atmosphere of public support to be created first through debate. Even the President may perhaps dare to change his stance if the feeling of public support existed.

v) Academics

they are writing and feeding the debate.

Arief Budiman has openly advocated policy reversal. Approves international pressure.

Mubiarto, Lukman Sukirno (Gadjah Mada), Riwanda also.

vi) Political parties

No use. Mass organisations are limited in East Timor.

vii) Other contacts DPR

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Imron Rosadi PPP
 Marcel Beding PDI
 Theo Sambuaga Golkar

Marzuki Daroesman: generally critical on many issues

General Sumitro: East Timor is Indonesian

General Dharsono: has had extensive foreign exposure, perhaps more sympathetic to ET self.det.- but has no power.

b. East Timor self determination?:

Difficult to find any in Indonesia at present who dare to agree with East Timor self determination, or the holding of a referendum. The Government would reject any talk on this at present. However, **there is increasing awareness that East Timor needs a new approach within the framework of the Indonesian state. A special regime.**

>Therefore proceed to push for self determination stepwise. Start pushing for autonomy, special status.

c. Seminar on East Timor:

To set up a public seminar need a permit. Would be hard to get. Holding it at an institution of higher learning would be OK. Universitas Indonesia (UI) or Gadjah Mada (UGM) would be the best.

At UI contact Professor Yuwono Sudarsono, Dean of Faculty of Social and Political Sciences. Could speak on foreign relations aspects and urban problems.

At UGM contact the Dean of Faculty of Social and Political Sciences Dr Ichlasul Amal (an ex-student of Herb Feith). Could speak on rural problems.

The seminar should work closely with mass media for maximum exposure.

Could try to get East Timorese student/academic from Australia or elsewhere to express the voice of leaders like Jose Ramos Horta. Don't attempt to involve JRH directly. Indonesian Government would not accept it as yet.

Timing: April is no good as election campaign starts. The Report of the Military Honour Body (Dewan Kehormatan Militer) is due in mid February. So as to keep up the momentum of the East Timor issue, hold seminar in March.

Note: Burhan Magenda appeared most excited and committed to the idea of the seminar, and undertook to contact his friend, Dean Yuwono Sudarsono to receive me to discuss it further.

[When I contacted him a few days later, the enthusiasm was gone. I received a cold reply that " the Dean will be very busy with examinations etc. for the rest of the semester and cant be involved with seminars.....try UGM, may be there they are more open...".

Clearly the Dean did not share Burhan Magenda's enthusiasm for such a seminar, being afraid of adverse consequences!].

d. Talks: between both sides would be good . How?

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17. FATHER HARDOPUTRANTO SJ- Catholic Priest, head of Church development agency involved in East Timor.- 1/2/92

a. Status of East Timor:

There is a dialogue at present between the East Timor Church, representing the people and the Jakarta Government. The aim is to get special status for ET.

Indonesia will in no way withdraw from East Timor. Therefore better struggle step by step. Try for special status at present. In the view of many in Indonesia and in the Church, this is the best solution now.

A 'special model' for ET status could be negotiated. The present situation is already 'special' under the military. This needs to be voiced out [articulated] by someone. The Governor of ET, the local Parliament (DPRD) or the local Church should do so.

East Timorese are not well represented in National Parliament (neither are others!)- so DPR is useless as a forum for this .

To get the momentum for this going involve the Governor, local DPR etc. but to prepare the ground, need foreign pressure from friendly states on Indonesian Government. But without much publicity, low profile.

Now is the best time for such international pressure. Many are not happy with Army conduct. Even Soeharto is displeased.

Canadian and Netherlands aid postponement is very helpful. US Embassy has communication channel to Indonesian Government : use this.

►Get US to pressure. Get strong pressure groups to act.

Deplu: are open to seek new solutions, e.g. Alatas and his initiative of inviting Portuguese parliament.

Military: closed. All of them.

Ex-military who worked in ET: some could be supportive.

b. 12 November:

Has had a major impact in showing that something is very wrong in ET.

The military never considered the need to have a good international image. Were never trained for this.

If Soeharto would have been in Indonesia at the time, he wouldn't have reacted to 12 November as he did. He only grasped the impact of foreign condemnation during his trip abroad when directly exposed to it.

c. Attitudes:

In 15 years no progress has been achieved in ET. The Indonesian Government does not wish to acknowledge its failure. Most civilian officials shift the blame to the military. They feel 'we are not involved in this problem', it is a military problem; 'you

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decided to get involved, you failed, now you fix it'. Even Alatas share this feeling.

Great tensions between military (Try Sutrisno) and Alatas exist due to this. Military commands Deplu, who resents it.

The result- typical of an undemocratic system- is that each group refuses to admit any responsibility, as if they were not involved, blaming the other.

The people of Indonesia are frustrated. There are no channels left to voice opinions or communicate with decision makers.

d. History:

East Timor integration could have been resolved in three months as in Goa. Yet due to military mishandling it went wrong. The damage is done. It goes on and on. Similarly in Irian Jaya, another military mistake.

The military has vested interest in East Timor. It benefits from keeping the war going on in its business interests, officer career advancement, institutional importance in the Indonesian system while fighting a war. Also resource appropriation (e.g. Catholic Relief Services donations in early 80s ended up funding military development work. The resources had to go to the military.)

It has been seen that with good military commanders can have dialogue, e.g. in 1983, and with Warrow. Yet this produces a destructive reaction. In 1983 dialogue was progressing well- then the Krarras massacre occurred. Indonesian soldiers were killed by other Indonesian soldiers [as a pretext?]. Now, the 12 November massacre- also started by the military.

As a result talks are now impossible.

e. Other contacts:

Ali Sadikin: great moral stature and public respect, but Government rejects everything from him.

Generals Soemitro, Saiyidiman Suryohadiprojo: good.

Prof Yuwono Sudarsono, Yusuf Wanandi (CSIS).

Suara Karya, Arief Budiman, Ansel Lopes (Kompas reporter)- may be frightened to talk however. [Chris Siner : no use, is an Istana reporter close to Moerdiono!].

Send material to media, especially Tempo, Editor.

Approach Deplu via Ambassador in Canberra : is open.

18. HAJI JC PRINSEN- LPHAM, Institute for the Defence of Human Rights, 3/2/92

a. History:

The intervention in Portuguese Timor was primarily the work of Ali Murtopo, who needed a success to be reinstated after the 1974 'Malari affair'. Indonesia helped all groups financially, including Fretilin. Soegiearto, the assistant to Murtopo knows of this. Also Harry Chan, Liem Bian Kee and brother ['Yusuf Wanandi' CSIS]. Then the intervention went wrong. The URSS attempted many unskilled efforts to gain influence in Indonesia. Wanted a base. Could have wanted East Timor to countervail Diego Garcia.

East Timor has been a costly mistake for all.

b. Princen's position:

Princen is interested in what Indonesia is doing in East Timor (human rights violations) rather than in East Timor as such. he favours integration, if properly done, i.e if human rights respected.

Wants to open a HR office in Dili.

c. 12 November:

12 November changed everything. After the cold war end, the international community is more critical of Indonesia. Cant shoot own citizens any more.

Indonesia will change approach: decrease army presence, change some methods. **Autonomy is not possible with present regime however. The only solution is Soeharto's fall-** but even if he falls it does not mean the system will change.

d. Present Indonesian situation:

For a further solution of the political conflict in Indonesia, need understanding of army.

The former offensive against Sukarno was also based on Human Rights.

The present conflict is about the President not caring about constitutional rights. Makes laws himself, calls it 'consensus'.

The army is now being attacked by Soeharto. The people hit by the army purification (especially the 2 generals punished for 12 November) are holding meetings in Jakarta with disaffected groups. Four days ago there was an alarm in Jakarta, the security forces were on alert. Student concentrations to protest against the lottery were being prepared. Islamic groups are split between following Soeharto and opposing the lottery. Soeharto may yield, changing the lottery in minor ways.

e. Benny/Soeharto conflict:

Princen was extensively questioned recently (Pat's name came up!).

He was interrogated by Soeharto supporters- Jakarta chief related to Ibu Tien. Later Benny's people took over. It appears Benny is trying to repair the damage done to himself. Benny is the great enemy of Soeharto. Mabes (headquarters) is more dangerous even than Benny. Yet Benny controls many lines.

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f. Church position:

Its thesis is 'East Timorese should accept integration', then get Church help to get educated and find liberation that way. ET will fall into the Indonesian Church eventually. 'Bishop Belo is revolutionary'. i.e there are two Church positions: quiet acquiescence and rebellion.

g. Talks:

► **International pressure should go on.**

Should press for autonomy. Now is a good moment. Carrascalão shout openly support and call for autonomy. Calling for independence wouldn't be accepted at this point, but refer to it at first as a call for a 'special region status'. Talks on this could advance.

A proper solution is only possible after Soeharto.

Princen and friends are doing their utmost for this to happen. Then it will be possible to negotiate a 'special status'.

19. ADAM SCHWARTZ- Far Eastern Economic Review Jakarta Correspondent, 3/2/92
 [in Jakarta 4½ years, very much moulded by the environment, typically US perception!]

a. Current climate:

There is evidence of great degree of opening towards more liberalisation among the elite. They are aware that political liberalisation must follow economic one. There is greater space for debates now, much greater media freedom. E.g. issues like gambling- in the past would have clamped down on debate.

Politically, minor irritants as Forum Demokrasi, or the Solidaritas Labour Union are tolerated. No political debates in Universities, only small beginnings recently.

However, Soeharto is strongly ensconced in power, these minor challenges can do little. These only call for greater HR. It would be best for himself and the country if he stepped down- but he won't. The longer he stays on, the more difficult the succession problem will be.

b. East Timor:

No debate allowed on this. There is an enormous information gap. No one here understands the ET perspective. No one can appreciate that Indonesians are disliked, and why.
The main problem is the information gap.

12 November has produced some analysis about what may be wrong. Two responses emerge:

- Why continue spending so much on East Timorese?- they are ungrateful,
- The human rights situation must be improved.

No one questions that ET should be part of Indonesia, not even intellectuals. This is not discussed at any level. Only human rights are.

How could ET be let to go? Aceh and others would want to follow. They contain too much wealth.

The media got away with much reporting after 12 November, since the foreign press was reporting. Initially everyone was so stunned, they didn't know how to react to curb reporting.

When problems like ET erupt, they cant understand the cause, they try to minimise them, explain them away.

The current explanation re East Timor is:

We have educated them, now they are clever but have no jobs, so they are unhappy. The answer is more jobs. Get the Konglomerat in to invest in job creation.

Indonesians cant conceive the profound alienation of Timorese. Anyone who points it out is considered dangerous, an enemy of Indonesia.

No change on East Timor will take place as no one understands or is supportive of East Timorese aspirations.

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The conflict will go on and on and become harder.
There will be a harder military line to come.

c. Talks:

No use for talks in Jakarta. No use for a seminar. No one will dare to present an opposing view. (Only Arief Budiman has dared to question integration- is not listened to.)

d. Soeharto :

Came out well of the latest crisis- juggled all sides. He ordered more funds and economic activity for East Timor. Yet he doesn't understand the basic hostility of Timorese against Indonesia. This is not surprising, given the lack of truthful reports. Either the military or coopted Timorese report to Jakarta , distorting reality to suit their aims. No one else dares to report.

e. Others:

Alatas: a liberal. Like his team, no question of East Timor independence. It is the 27th province.

When faced with human rights accusations- accuses the West of double standards.

Abdurrachman Wahid: One of the limited 'opponents' of Soeharto. Is tolerated, as there is need to have one. Is clever and resourceful, but cant move masses. Also has internal leadership problems in NU. Cant go far.

20. IAN MCINTOSH - Australian Broadcasting Commission correspondent, 4/2/92

a. conflict resolution:

Need to find a good neutral international mediator for the East Timor dispute. Third World. e.g. Nyerere.

►Do something in the lead up to the Non Aligned meeting.

Look at conflict resolution work by Roger Fisher of Harvard.

b. Talks:

Keep in touch with Ian. He will try to identify people who are more open, who could canvas talks idea with.

c. Australian Embassy:

Most don't fully grasp realities. Kevin Evans, Third Secretary has one of the best grasps of Indonesian realities.

21. ARISTIDES KATOPPO - Suara Pembaruan Chief Director, 4/2/92

[liberal, sympathetic to greater autonomy for East Indonesia, involved with Irian Jaya.]

A. Katoppo opened a newspaper in East Timor, Suara Timor Timur, even if makes a loss, to help them develop autonomy in debates. To get some light shining. No one believed its use.

a. East Timor integration:

The Government is trapped in its own policy, and cant see a way to break out. The key to a solution would be to help them break out.

AK compares it to the Buruh Island detainees impasse in 1975- the Government didn't know how to resolve it. It was also locked into its own policy- was eventually led to accept the previously unthinkable solution of releasing them.

b. Current views:

Many intellectuals assume integration is a reality which cant be questioned. The issue simply cant be rationally discussed at present. It is an unmentionable option. Any one publicly advocating a withdrawal is branded a 'traitor'. Particularly as at present in the military there are many bruised by recent events.

Most intellectuals, even if pro-human rights, consider independence unthinkable at present.

A retreat would raise questions about viability of an independent state, problems of factions in Timorese society. Also problems of loss of face.

The problem is : how to persuade Soeharto and military high command to open up to suggestions. At present they are closed to pressures from intellectuals and suggestions.

c. Search for solutions:

12 November made it clear that cant continue present situation, is not viable. Independence is also not acceptable.

►**Seek an in-between solution at first.**

Need to win without letting others appearing as loosing.
Need to acknowledge there were some good intentions. Keep 'Javanese concept of power' in mind.

In '83 feelers were sent out. No results.

Now : is the elite situation different? Is it susceptible to consider change?. Doubts exist.

May need a stimulus from outside. A non-hostile one, perceived as not intending to corner Indonesia.

An **outside mediator**: if Lee Kwan Yew would be willing, may be a suitable one. ASEAN, non-western. Soeharto might be responsive.

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d. Autonomy:

This is the most viable solution. Have locals appointed to key positions of responsibility. Localise power: DPRD etc. Need to find a local model of autonomy for East Timor, whereby the local identity can blend into the national (Indonesian) framework. The Irian experience shows it should be possible.

►Even if ultimately want independence, follow an indirect path: decentralisation, autonomy, cultural rights.

e. International pressure:

The international community uses the slogan of self-determination in speeches etc. But there is no real international pressure on Indonesia to give up East Timor.

Some current international pressure is counter-productive. Quiet persuasive diplomacy would be best. Need to be sensitive to Asian psyche: need to avoid confrontation, to save face.

Security becomes more uptight as result of pressure.

f. Seminar/Talks:

There are few people of status which are objective and could be accepted by both parties. Dialogue would be useful however.

A seminar would be a good initiative to start. Needs not to be perceived as hostile to Indonesian policy makers: they would turn deaf ear.

Use a location abroad, preferably in ASEAN, perceived sensitive to Indonesian concerns. (Singapore needs to be!)

The Centre for Southeast Asian Studies (CSEAS) in Singapore could be ideal. Or Bangkok.

Japanese could be good mediators perhaps?

Australia unsuitable- perceived as biased. Also Dutch unsuitable.

CSIS: not so close to rulers now. No use.

g. Some personalities:

Gen Soemitro: can be very militaristic- don't approach yet.

Mangun Wijaya: has good views. No direct influence.

Yuwono Sudarsono: always toes Government line.

Ben Mboi: could be one of the best to find solution.

Gen. Saiyidiman: ?

Gen. Hasnan Habib (ex Amb to Washington): more intellectual than Saiyidiman. See him.

Prof selo Sumarjan: is javanese. At present sick.

Rachmat Witoelar: try.

22. MARCEL BEDING- Deputy Head of PDI Fraction in Parliament, International Affairs Commission of Parliament member (Komisi I), International Editor of Kompas, 5/2/92

[An old personal friend from Flores. A Catholic personality. Cautious, but privately critical of system faults]

**** Given in confidence of old personal acquaintance: do not publicly attribute****

a. Fundamental problems exist:

Need to acknowledge that there is a problem in East Timor. Bishop Belo's letter to UN some time back produced a strong hostile reaction from DPR Komisi I. MD pointed out that there must be a reason- needs to investigate what it may be, not merely reject and condemn the Bishop.

12 November was a long awaited opportunity by the East Timorese to convey their displeasure about local conditions.

The East Timorese may be simple people, but they have a high sense of justice.

For hundreds of years the people were colonised. With integration got new officials, as bad as the previous colonisers- even harsher in the view of many.

i) Too rapid change is taking place.

According to MB: too many changes being forced on the East Timor population which they cannot grasp. Talk about Pancasila etc.

Their simple social background, the relative homogeneity of their society in the past does not allow them to quickly come to terms with the plurality of Indonesia. They need time.

e.g. now there is Islam which they are asked to also respect- they feel threatened as if they have to submit. See Government building mosques, feel they are being islamised. Are confused by praying in offices- in Portuguese times the place for prayer was clearly the Church.

Under such conditions, there is not much meaning to talk about development in the form of building schools, Universities etc. people are concerned with more basic grievances.

ii) No work.

In the past there may have been fewer schools, but all had work. Now more are educated, but there is no work.

iii) Army bad behaviour.

The army builds to develop, but their behaviour is bad. People witness every day things that they don't like and which makes them dislike integration: beatings, rape, etc. Therefore people reject the development. For example now there may be 600 km of roads. But people will say "what for, walking on the roads damages our feet".

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There are too many army personnel in East Timor.

iv) Newcomers.

Too many people come in from elsewhere. Get facilities, are better equipped to play the system. East Timorese are not equipped to compete. Loose out.

v) Uniform Indonesian laws implementation.

National laws are implemented too fast as there is no special status. For example land laws, which give the state custody of land. This is traumatic for East Timorese, given their attachment to land. They feel the State wants to take away their land and give to others.

Education is also implemented uniformly: unsuitable to force uniformity with Jakarta.

b. Try Sutrisno:

MB asked Try two questions in the DPR hearings after 12 November, which he couldn't answer:

- Why must the army straight away shoot to protect itself? shouldn't they sacrifice themselves first to try and control things otherwise?

- Foreign news reports spoke of truckloads taken to mass graves. Why the haste to dispose of victims? Not being able to bury their dead profoundly hurts the feelings of the population.

MB went with him to visit East Timor for Christmas. Could hold long conversation.

Try agreed that: **In 15 years the security approach in ET has not worked. There must be something very wrong.**

c. Church role:

The security approach proponents blamed the Church for not wanting to cooperate. Their understanding of 'cooperation' was that the Church should become an instrument, an accessory for the security approach.

This is not the Churches role. The Church has to defend Human Rights, not defend the Government. The Bishop must defend his people when the need arises. Indonesian officials and military have never understood this. [See Mubiarto's report].

Bishop Belo told the Australian Parliamentary Delegation to Dili in 1991

Most of the people do not feel any use from integration.

Only a small minority benefited.

Belo wants greater autonomy, so that ET can be governed appropriately, according to the level of development there is.

d. Corrective measures:

An urgent solution must be found. It is a Catholic region, "daerah kita".

The fundamental problem now is how to regain the confidence of the people.

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The Church should be allowed a greater and more positive role in this. The 'security approach' must be reduced.

Should involve greater number of Nusa Tenggara People to help. Draw on these human resources. They are more similar to East Timorese. (Javanese etc. are disliked).

e. Seminar:

A most valuable and timely idea!.
 Could hold it in NTT Province for example.
 CSEAS Singapore would be very good.

Invite people closely involved with East Timor, rather than those who speak at distance.

Discussions in the United Nations have been fruitless. Use resources outside UN.

International meetings are useful however. e.g. at the last Interparliamentary Organisation meeting in Kuala Lumpur three years ago, the idea of inviting Portuguese parliamentarians to East Timor arose [!].

Have a closed seminar as CSEAS. Invite M. Beding, Ben Mboi, Ramos Horta. DPR will enter recess early April. Election campaign in May, so act soon.

f. Others to talk to:

Javanese media people are difficult with regards to ET. Their interest in ET is limited to news items.

Only in NTT Province is there a profound concern for ET.

Lopes da Cruz: DPA member. Knows about KPN report, going with Amaral to Geneva.

Albert Hasibuan, A. Katoppo, Suara Pembaruan.

Goenawan, Tempo. Arief Budiman, Frans Seda, Ben Mang Reng Say. Ben Mboi. Others in ABRI are in difficulties at present- wrong time to approach them.

23. SAHUR HUTABARAT-Senior Redactor Editor Magazine- 5/2/92
 [A young, daring and very open critic of the government]

a. 12 November:

Set the East Timor issue back 10 years. In the eyes of DEPLU people, East Timor was almost resolved as an international issue. The pressure following 12 November showed that this is not so.

KPN Report: purely an exercise to save foreign aid.

b. Talks/Seminar:

Ali Alatas will not want to dialogue except under UN framework.

Interior Minister Rudini -has good access to military (ex Chief of Staff) . Has shown willingness to talk so far.

Will top bureaucrats dare to?

Who is to lobby for talks?

Abdurrachman Wahid: an open intellectual. Has access to policy makers. Murdiono and Benny.

Yuwono Sudarsono: this could be too advanced for him.

Robbie.. (?) Kompas. Suisanto Pujo...(?), Deputy Editor in Chief Jakarta Post, Mochtar Adi (?), daniel S..(?), Aristides katoppo Suara Pembaruan, Sarwono Kusumaatmaja, Siswono will be important in new cabinet.

Speakers in Seminar: Admiral Soedibio, Chief of Staff; Yuwono Sudarsono is good; Mubiarto- studied East Timor; Dr Lukman Soetrisno (Cornell); Arief Budiman.

c. Future:

Soeharto will stand again. Yet a new unpredictable factor has emerged: the young generation of electors.

Golkar is better prepared to face these than the parties.

(getting them involved in campaign T shirt businesses, etc).

If the Non-Aligned Summit is a success, will help Soeharto's standing significantly! [therefore target this for East Timor!!]

The problem of cheating at the elections is serious. PPP, PDI don't have enough watchers.

d. Australia:

Indonesia is coming to the conclusion that Australia often merely complicates matters (merepotkan). Not of assistance, despite their 'good intentions'to help. Better keep them out.

e. Article:

►►Provide Editor articles on the vision for a future East Timor State and other themes. He assured me they will publish Ramos Horta articles. Fax to Saur Hutabarat.

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26. ABDURRACHMAN WAHID- NU, Forum Demokrasi, 7/2/92

a. 12 November effect:

In the past the army was too powerful in East Timor. It is a special case where it was in full control. Even Rudini (Interior Minister), Nana Sutrisna (DEPLU), and Sabam Siagiaan acknowledged that no one else had any power over ET matters.

The 12 November changed this position. **Now can begin to pressure the armed forces.** They are not as strong as before.

Need to lessen the military presence in East Timor first and then get NGOs involved to a greater extent.

►The factor of international pressure to get withdrawal of military and increase civilian power is very important. Keep it up!!

AW said to recently visiting German State Minister for Foreign Affairs:

Now your voice is even more important. In the past it fell on stone walls. Now the wall has cracked and the voice is seeping through.

b. Four important points:

● Certain terms should not be used as they are misunderstood by Indonesian Government. 'Autonomy' is misunderstood as separatism, secession. Talk about 'decentralisation'.

●The Church has an important role as the only institution which can give support to the shocked and terrorised population.

●NGOs should be invited to transform ET society, uplift living standards, health etc. Insist that Indonesian Government gives NGOs this task.

●Need to persuade Indonesian Government to lessen military presence in East Timor.

AW will point this out to Michio Watanabe in March.

►Raise these four points at INGGI in March. Put them in acceptable language.

Need a 'positive approach,' gradually reduce military pressure, don't alienate.

I.e need to present aims in an acceptable way to get Indonesian Government to listen. Trying a process of reconciling two opposing positions.

c. Talks/New vision for East Timor State:

Make the East Timorese vision for their post occupation state clear. A state friendly towards Indonesia. It is good, useful. Could discuss with Indonesian officials. Abdurrachman Wahid would be prepared to put this vision to officials through individual contacts, to start dialogue.

►Provide him material for this, to convey to top decision makers.

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JRH and his friends should become identified with this vision. JRH should only approach DEPLU at later stage, once Indonesian Government sees the need to change basic policy. Contacts now would alienate the armed forces.

d. Information flow:

In Indonesia unlike Australia, information is compartmentalised. Only a few at the top see real data. Others only get to see reports from top. Interior, Foreign Affairs, Se. Neg etc. make their decisions on basis of these reports (i.e. on second hand informations). To circumvent this, we should try to disseminate information on East Timor to all levels.

► **Disseminate findings of Australian Parliamentary Inquiry Into Australia/Indonesia Relations.**

e. Soeharto :

AW wants to get the president to bend. For KPN had to supply him the information of what really happened in East Timor. Ministers etc. needed to be convinced to do this,

Soeharto is not so inflexible regarding East Timor policy. If the cost gets too high, he will change it.

He was very afraid that US would remove 'most favoured nation status', not only afraid of aid cuts. Thus agreed to KPN.

Soeharto is again in control of the situation. Has to check the armed forces.

f. Others to see:

Not all NGOs are open to recognise the legitimacy of both Indonesian and East Timor claims. Most take sides. Yuwono Sudarsono ceases to talk when validity of claims questioned(?). ET is only a strategic framework to benefit the Indonesian Government. Media not daring enough now.

g. Seminar:

Need to convince CSEAS for seminar.

Would Japan be a better venue?

Make it open.

Inviting Arief Budiman would be counterproductive: too critical.

Yuwono Sudarsono is better. Marzuki Daroesman.

CSIS are too committed to old policy.

Gen Soemitro?, Ben Mboi, Carrascalão, Aristides Katoppo, Goenawan Mohammad, Saiyidiman, Suhardiman, Comm. Subiyakto (CSIS wont see as too dangerous to send a military member), Ong Koham (Sukarnoist!) could also be useful.

h. Benny Murdani:

His vision for Indonesia in future is quite good, "a reasonable man, not stupid".

i. Jose Ramos Horta/ Abdurrachman Wahid:

Abdurrachman Wahid wishes to meet JRH and other ET leaders in Australia. Could meet in Europe in March or INGGI in Japan.

► **Advise fax +62 21 390 8425.**

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27. Ret. Gen. SAIYIDIMAN SURYOHADIPROJO- Ex Lemhanas Governor, Ex Ambassador to Japan. -7/2/92

[Is an ideologue of the '45 Generation. Clearly exhibits the mindset of this group. As Governor of the Military Institute, shaped the thinking of the military who are currently in power. Writes on need to return to original values at present. The meeting was a less than pleasant surprise. He became increasingly hostile as he preached a typically Javanese perception of reality.]

a. Need for a solution:

The East Timor problem needs to be solved, for the good of the East Timorese and the interests and integrity of Indonesia. The Government and Armed Forces very much want to find a true solution.

Only a small minority of East Timorese want independence. Most don't want it.

It wouldn't be a viable state. Would need support. Hasn't got the human resources to be successful.

b. Cultural factors:

The problem is not one of cultural differences [as I timidly suggested, after being urged to suggest what the problem could be!].

Portugal was a very bad colonist. TNI (Indonesian Army) is used to handle ethnic differences. Is skilled at it in view of the long successful experience in the rest of Indonesia. Cultural differences are not a problem for TNI 45 Generation, we know how to work with them. The Dutch claimed Indonesia can only become one nation if Dutch stay here acting as a bond. It wasn't the case.

Why didn't East Timorese leaders have the wisdom to cooperate with Indonesia to build a better future?

Why do die hards refuse seeking such a better future?

Is it because they consider themselves as better people if they are linked to the whites, rather than join fellow Asians?

Indonesia also had some such misguided groups in the past. They preferred to be servants to whites. Some Maluku people thought being party of Indonesia would be degrading, preferred to be an inferior part of a European system than full members of an Asian system.

Don't they realise that in a short time Indonesia did more for East Timor than with all the years under Portugal? Indonesia is making much progress.

What matters is the interest of the people of East Timor as a whole. They are served better by integration, like people of Maluku, NTT etc. However a few leaders, travelling internationally, (paid by whom?) keep opposing it.

A people can only make real progress if they make it in their own capacity.

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[being set in the anti Dutch colonial dispute, he seemed oblivious to the relevance of this against Javanese colonialism!]

c. Background:

When Saiyidiman was Governor of Lemhanas he was not at first convinced that Indonesia should get involved in East Timor. When he was told if the Indonesian Army does not comply with Apodeti's request to intervene, if Fretilin took power China or USSR would come in, he changed his mind. They wanted to control the strategic Wetar Straights.

When he went to East Timor for the first time, saw how backward the people were. The result of poor Portuguese colonialism. He realised what a drain on the Indonesian economy East Timor would be.

d. Shortcomings:

There might have been some shortcomings in ET on the Indonesian side in the past. How was Warrow? [Saiyidiman seemed to have wanted to hear that current problems are merely a result of individual leader mistakes]

To fix these mistakes is a tactical matter.

The strategic approach is to ask : where are we heading to?

President Soeharto still realises he comes from the common people, even if he may have made some mistakes. This awareness wouldn't be there if the Dutch would have set up the Indonesian leadership.

Indonesian leaders still strive for the welfare of the common people.

e. Future evolution:

Economic development must go hand in hand with human resources development and political system development.

Indonesia is also working towards greater decentralisation.

This will be the main emphasis for the next 25 years.

Is a problem for ET also.

Improvement of the political system needs better people's representation, more regional decentralisation.

Let ET leaders work constructively. Now need economic build up.

f. an independent East Timor?

Indonesia will never agree to the separation of East Timor.

He would ask them: "how would you do it?" It is impossible, they would fall into the hands of other nations: US capitalism, Australia etc.

ET leaders must be convinced that it is an illusion to try to be independent all alone.

An independence in 'close harmony' with Indonesia like

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Singapore's may have perhaps been an option 16 years ago, provided it would not have ended up as a USSR/China satellite. Now Indonesia has committed too much to ET. It committed itself as a result of an invitation by part of the ET people.

After making the commitment, Indonesia decided to make it successful.

Also, if East Timorese want to be in harmony with Indonesia, as a fellow ASEAN member, but independent: Where will they get their resources from? It would not be realistic to expect political independence, yet economic dependence as part of the Indonesian economic system. Indonesia also does not support other ASEAN members economically.

Indonesia would not feel obliged to develop an independent East Timor, as Irian Jaya is being developed, and the rest of Indonesia is. Already are giving greater priority to ET development.

ET independence is an illusion by leaders who want to be called 'President' etc. Independence is not the view of the common people. They would be the victims of this lack of realism.

g. Seminar:

OK if others organise it. He is not in a position to organise such. Also has no funds.

Would participate, but depends on the references of the seminar. In any case, he is always ready to give his contribution to solve the East Timor problem. [!!]

[h. in summary:

angered when suggested that problem cultural gap. Expected to hear merely a criticism of Warrow's leadership.

Refuses to accept a policy failure.

Claims to want the best solution for ET. Which he knows to be integration. Independence is only an illusion of a misguided mestizo elite which looks down on Asians, encouraged by white colonialists. But the people know better. ABRI is culturally sensitive and respectful of ethnic differences. Economically, which is what really matters, Indonesia is doing the right thing.][this perception is important because it is probably that shared by the rest of the '45 elite, including to some extent Soeharto]

28. MISCELLANEOUS

Several conversations with old friends: members of the business class, the old aristocracy, as well as some working as drivers, servants, plus talk to taxi drivers, students etc. convey a general picture of frustration and disenchantment with the Soeharto Government. A feeling of hopelessness, of belief that things can only get worse until the Government falls. Many called him and his family thieves, plunderers in collusion with Chinese and other foreigners. Unprecedentedly scathing criticism.

In this context the observation by someone, that according to its second Officer, the Singapore Foreign Office expects major anti-Chinese riots in Indonesia in the near future, should be noted. This would affect ASEAN.

The general public feeling in Jakarta seems to be one of frustration and expectation for something unforeseen to happen.

-oOo-

Darwin ,17 February 1992